Santander Bank v. Steve HoSang by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-7-2016 
Santander Bank v. Steve HoSang 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Santander Bank v. Steve HoSang" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 16. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/16 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2897 
___________ 
 
SANTANDER BANK 
 
v. 
 
STEVE M. HOSANG;  
MRS. STEVE M. HOSANG, HIS WIFE; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
     Steve HoSang,  
    Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-01981) 
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 18, 2015 
 
Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  January 7, 2016 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 On March 17, 2015, days after Santander Bank, N.A., mailed Steve M. HoSang a 
notice of a motion for entry of final judgment in a state foreclosure action in the New 
Jersey Superior Court, HoSang removed the foreclosure action to the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey.  In his notice of removal, he cited 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1443, stating that Santander Bank’s filing of a foreclosure action in state, instead of 
federal, court resulted in a denial of (or his inability to enforce) his civil rights.  He 
argued that Santander Bank did not have standing to bring the action, and that he could 
not exercise his constitutional right to confront Santander Bank because it is a 
corporation.  He elaborated on his standing arguments in an “initial brief” that he filed in 
support of his notice of removal.  (HoSang argued that the foreclosure complaint should 
be quashed because Santander Bank should not be permitted to stand in the place of the 
original lender or creditor.)  In the beginning of May, HoSang filed a motion for default 
judgment because Santander Bank had not appeared in the action or responded to the 
notice of removal.  (HoSang asserted that Santander Bank had been served.) 
 One day after final judgment was entered in the foreclosure action in favor of 
Santander Bank, counsel for the bank wrote to the District Court to state that Santander 
Bank was “only advised of the removal by Defendant HoSang over the past few days and 
just discovered Mr. HoSang’s motion.”  Santander Bank requested an extension of time 
to file a response and a motion to remand.  The District Court allowed the extension (to 
which HoSang objected with alleged proof of service of his notice of removal and motion 
for default).  On June 17, 2015, Santander Bank filed the response and motion.   
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 In support of remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), Santander Bank argued that 
HoSang improperly and untimely removed the matter to federal court in an attempt to 
engage in forum shopping.  Santander also contended that removal on the basis of 
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 was improper under § 1441(b) and the 
“forum defendant rule” because HoSang was a citizen of the forum state.   
 The District Court granted Santander Bank’s motion and denied the motion for 
default judgment as moot.  The District Court remanded the matter to state court.  The 
District Court concluded that although HoSang cited § 1443 in his notice of removal, he 
also sought to premise jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  The District Court ruled that 
“neither provision establishes subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state court 
foreclosure action.”  The District Court more specifically determined that removal under 
§ 1443 was improper because no federal question was presented on the face of the 
complaint and the notice of removal merely had defenses or presumed counterclaims 
based on alleged violations of federal law.  The District Court also stated that HoSang’s 
New Jersey citizenship defeated any attempt at removal under § 1441(b).   
 HoSang appeals.  In addition to contesting the entry of judgment by the state court, 
HoSang asserts that the District Court had jurisdiction to hear his action.  He maintains 
that he raised constitutional issues, namely challenges under the Sixth and Eleventh 
Amendments based on how he was treated by the state trial court and the clerk of court.    
In its brief and in a motion, Santander Bank asks us to dismiss the appeal for lack of 
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jurisdiction.  Alternatively, in its motion, Santander Bank requests that we summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order.  Hosang opposes the motion.1    
 We grant Santander Bank’s motion to dismiss in part, and we will dismiss this 
appeal to the extent that we lack jurisdiction over the District Court’s remand order.  
Section 1447(d) provides that a remand order is “not reviewable on appeal or otherwise” 
unless the removal in the first instance was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 or 1443.  
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).  The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that an 
appeals court has no jurisdiction to review orders that were entered pursuant to a district 
court’s authority to remand under § 1447(c), namely those remand orders that are based 
on “any defect in removal procedure” or a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, whether 
erroneous or not.2  See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229-
30 (2007) (discussing Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), and 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996)).  Accordingly, we need not and 
do not review the District Court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because the diversity requirement was not met.  See Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 
                                              
1 Santander Bank also presents a motion to supplement the appendix, which has also been 
construed as a motion to expand the record.   
 
2 On appeal, Santander Bank also presents the argument that the removal was untimely.  
We do not reach the question.  We note that not only did the District Court not rule on the 
basis of timeliness, but also that it is unclear whether the District Court could have 
remanded based on untimeliness given when Santander Bank responded to the notice of 
removal.  Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. Dring, 351 F.3d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 2003).  (Because 
it is unnecessary to our analysis, we also do not resolve the service question that the 
parties dispute.) 
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1047 (3d Cir. 1997) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction “insofar as it is predicated 
on § 1441”). 
 We have jurisdiction to determine whether remand was proper insofar as removal 
was sought under § 1443.  See Davis, 107 F.3d at 1047.  We exercise plenary review over 
the underlying basis for remand to the extent it involves a legal question.  See Lazorko v. 
Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Upon review, we conclude that the District Court did not err in ruling that HoSang 
could not remove the foreclosure action under the provision he invoked, § 1443.  As the 
District Court noted, jurisdiction under this provision must be plain from the face of the 
complaint.  Davis, 107 F.3d at 1047.  Furthermore, for § 1443(1) to apply,3 “a state court 
defendant must demonstrate both (1) that he is being deprived of rights guaranteed by a 
federal law ‘providing for . . . equal civil rights’; and (2) that he is ‘denied or cannot 
enforce that right in the courts’ of the state.”  Davis, 107 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Georgia v. 
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966)).  The civil rights at issue must involve matters of 
racial equality.  Id.  HoSang, in presenting the foreclosure complaint, and arguing, inter 
alia, that he was being deprived of a confrontation right, did not show that he was entitled 
to removal under § 1443.   
                                              
3 HoSang did not allege in the District Court, and does not argue on appeal, anything that 
might allow removal under § 1443(2), which relates to the execution of certain duties by 
federal officers.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 
824 (1966).  
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 Accordingly, to the extent that we have jurisdiction over the District Court’s order 
remanding the matter to state court, we will affirm it.4  We grant in part the motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and we will dismiss this appeal to the extent that we do 
not have jurisdiction over the remand order.  The “motion to dismiss appeal or for 
summary action” is otherwise denied.  The motion to supplement the appendix is granted, 
but, to the extent that Santander Bank seeks to expand the record with its supplemental 
appendix, the request is denied.  
                                              
4 We also discern no error in the District Court’s decision to deny HoSang’s motion for 
default judgment as moot in light of the remand. 
 
